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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent,

vs.

Case No.
8375

CHESTER MATHIS,
Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 18, 1957 in the District Court of Salt Lake
County, the appellant was convicted of a crime and sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison. For the purpose
of this brief, respondent adopts the facts as described on
pages 4 and 5 of appellant's brief.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
IT WAS WITHIN THE DISCRETIONARY POWERS OF THE TRIAL JUDGE TO GRANT A
CONTINUANCE OF TRIAL.
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POINT II
THE CONTINUANCE OF TRIAL GRANTED
TO THE STATE DID NOT DEPRIVE APPELLANT OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
A "SPEEDY TRIAL".
POINT III
IF THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN
GRANTING THE CONTINUANCE TO THE
STATE, IT WAS HARMLESS AND NOT PREJUDICIAL TO THE SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS OF
THE APPELLANT.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
IT WAS WITHIN THE DISCRETIONARY POWERS OF THE TRIAL JUDGE TO GRANT A
CONTINUANCE OF TRIAL.
There is strong and numerous authority in this state
for the proposition that the granting of a continuance is a
question within the discretion of the trial court.
"Whether a postponement of the trial should or
should not be granted on showing made is a matter
within the discretion of the trial court, and a denial
of postponement will not be regarded as reversible
error unless clearly prejudicial." State v. Fairclough
(1935 Utah) 44 P. 2d 692.
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See also State v. Williams (1917 Utah) 163 P. 1104, State
v. Cano (1924 Utah) 228 P. 563, and State v. Anselmo (1915
Utah) 148 P. 1071.
In State v. Hartman (1941 Utah) 119 P. 2d 112, a case
cited by appellant, the trial court had denied defendant's
motion for a continuance and he appealed. This court said,
at page 114:
"The granting of a continuance in a criminal
case is discretionary with the court and its refusal
to grant a continuance is not reversible error unless
clearly prejudicial."
In the cited case, the defendant had been denied a continuance at trial and appealed on that basis. We have found
no Utah cases where appeal has been sustained on the
ground that it was error to grant the state a continuance.

POINT II
THE CONTINUANCE OF TRIAL GRANTED
TO THE STATE DID NOT DEPRIVE APPELLANT OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
A "SPEEDY TRIAL".
As appellant declares at the outset of his second point
(Appellant's brief, p. 4) the substantive question here is
whether granting the continuance amounted to a violation
of appellant's constitutional rights. More precisely, it is
whether appellant was denied his right to a "speedy trial".
Trial was set for June 5, and on that date on the state's
motion, it was continued to June 18, a delay of 13 days.
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The constitutional guarantee of a "speedy trial", as
other guarantees, is based on experience and good reason;
to prevent arbitrary delays in the prosecution of criminal
actions often resulting in lost evidence and faulty convictions, and to prevent long imprisonment of accused persons
before trial. Constitution of the United States, John Randolph Tucker, ( 1899) . Its ancestry may be traced far back
into the history of English criminal law where early attempts were made to prevent extended imprisonment before trial. An old and oft cited decision describes the right
in general.
"Nor does a speedy trial mean a trial immediately upon the presentation of the indictment or the
arrest upon it, but simply means that the trial shall
take place as soon as possible after the indictment
is found, without depriving the prosecution a reasonable time for preparation. The law is the embodiment of reason and good sense; * * *." Ex parte
Stanley, 1868 Nev. 4 Nev. 113.
Speaking generally of the right to a "speedy trial" Justice
McKenna said in Beavers v. Haubert:
"The right of a speedy trial is necessarily relative, it is consistent with delays and depends upon
circumstances. It secures rights to a defendant, it
does not preclude the rights of public justice." 1905
198 U. S. 77, 25 S. Ct. 573.
See also Nixon v. State, 2 S & M (Miss.) 507, and Stewart

v. State (1853 Ark.) 13 Ark. 720.
Appellant's argument begins by asserting as a foundation the "speedy trial" guarantee of the Utah constitution
(Appellant's Brief, p. 5). The argument then seeks in addition to rely on two sections of the Utah Code of Criminal
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Procedure which are quoted, 77-24-18 and 77-29-1. The first
prohibits undue postponement in trial and the second provides the means by which a postponement or continuance
may be obtained. Appellant asserts that the continuance
granted the state was improper because the procedure described in Section 77-29-1 is not strictly complied with, i. e.
that there was not sufficient cause shown by affidavit. Here
the argument assumes a double front; on the one hand that
the delay amounted to a deprivation of the right to a "speedy
trial", and on the other that the failure to comply strictly
with Section 77-29-1 violated due process. The due process
argument is not properly before the court. The failure to
comply with required criminal procedure does not in every
instance constitute a violation of due process. The procedure followed may have been error, but it was not prejudicial to substantive rights. If the situation had been reversed and appellant had been denied a continuance, then
the question of due process could likely be raised.
The core of the problem and the real substantive issue,
as stated above, is whether the delay as a result of the
continuance, deprived appellant of his right to a "speedy
trial". The necessity of a workable definition of the term
"speedy trial" is apparent. Appellant did not cite in his brief
a section of the Utah code which we feel is likely determinative of this problem. Section 77-51-1 reads:
"Dismissal for failure to prosecute.-The court,
unless good cause to the contrary is shown, must
order the prosecution to be dismissed in the following cases:
" ( 1) When a person has been held to answer
for a public offense, if an information is not filed
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nor an indictment found against him at the next
term of the court at which he is held to answer.
"(2) If the defendant, whose trial has not been
postponed upon his application, is not brought to
trial at the next term of the court in which the information or indictment is triable after it is filed
or found."
This section is mandatory and requires the dismissal of the
prosecution unless the conditions enumerated are complied
with. Those conditions are time limitations within which
the information must be filed and the defendant tried. Several states have similar code provisions providing that if
the time limits are not complied with the cause shall be
dismissed or the prisoner discharged. In the cases we have
found, the courts have interpreted these mandatory time
guarantees as being supplemental to and definitive of the
right to a "speedy trial" as guaranteed in state constitutions.
In Ex parte Trull (1931 Kans.) 298 P. 775, the information was filed about two and one-half years after arrest,
and the Kansas Supreme Court was dealing with a section
of the code similar to ours which provided a maximum period beyond which an accused person could not be held and
providing that at the expiration of said period the person
so held shall be discharged. In considering this code section
together with the "speedy trial" provision of the constitution the court said:
"It is generally held that the statutes supplement the constitution and are to be regarded as
rendering the constitutional guarantee effective and
constitute a legislative definition of what is, under
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the circumstances named, a reasonable and proper
delay in bringing the accused to trial."
This principle followed an earlier Kansas decision, see In
re McMicken (Kans.) 18 P. 473.
California also follows this interpretation. In In re
Begerow, (1901 Cal.) 65 P. 828, a case quoted by appellant,
the petitioner was discharged because he had been held for
more than 60 days in violation of the code. The California
Penal Code, Section 1382, provides that the court, unless
for good cause shown, must dismiss the prosecution when
an accused, if trial has not been postponed on his application, has not been to trial within 60 days· after indictment.
The court in speaking of this statutory provision in the
light of the "speedy trial" guarantee, said :
"The statute is a construction of the constitutional provision, so far as to indicate what is a reasonable time within which a case should be brought
to trial, in order that the constitutional guarantee
may be kept. And it may be fairly interpreted to be
that this guarantee is violated whenever 60 days is
allowed to elapse without a trial; * * * "
Oklahoma courts have held similarly that the constitutional provision guaranteeing a "speedy trial" is a term of
indeterminate meaning and permits legislative definition
to some extent. See Application of Hayes (1956 Okla.) 301
P. 2d 701. See also State v. Keefe (1908) 98 P. 122, a Wyoming case, which also adopts this principle in defining
the constitutional guarantee.
There are two significant Utah decisions discussing the
requirements of Section 77-51-1 above quoted, as it applies

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8
to the right to a "speedy trial." In State v. Endsley, (1899
Utah) 57 P. 430, the defendant appealed on the ground that
the trial was not held at ~he next term after filing the information as required by Section 5065 Revised Statutes
1898 (Section 5065 is identical to above quoted section
77-51-1). This court sa:id:
"Doubtless by this statute the legislature intended to secure to every defendant in a criminal
prosecution a speedy trial, in the absence of good
cause being shown for delay; * * * "
In State v. Rutledge (1922 Utah) 227 P. 479, an appeal
was taken to the Supreme Court on the ground that after
the defendant had been committed, the district attorney
failed to file an information within the period required by
Section 9345 Com. Laws of Utah 1917, identical to present
Section 77-51-1. The appellant asserted that the delay violated the defendant's right to a "speedy trial". This court
said:
"The right of an accused person to have a
speedy public trial (Const. of Utah, Art. I, Sec. 12)
so far as the filing of the information is concerned,
is secured by Comp. Laws of Utah 1917, Section
9345, * * *"
Obviously the trial in this case
period described in Section 77-51-1,
to a "speedy trial" was not violated.
filed on May 16 (R. 6) and trial was
within the April term of the court.

was within the time
and appellant's right
The information was
held on June 18, both
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POINT III
IF THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN
GRANTING THE CONTINUANCE TO THE
STATE, IT WAS HARMLESS AND NOT PREJUDICIAL TO THE SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS OF
THE APPELLANT.
On the basis of the state's motion for a continuance,
trial was postponed from June 5th to June 18th, a period
of less than two weeks. If it can be said that granting the
continuance was error, how can it reasonably be asserted
that such a brief delay prejudiced the appellant. It would
be another thing if, as pointed out in Point II above, it had
been the defendant's request for continuance that had been
denied. The delay which resulted in this case is certainly
not the long delay or extended imprisonment which the framers of the constitution intended to prevent by inserting a
provision guaranteeing the right to a "speedy trial".
Section 77-42-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is a codification of that principle of appellate review holding that
a cause will not be reversed for error or defect unless the
substantive rights of the accused are effected.
This court in 1953 in State v. Neal, 262 P. 2d 756, declared:
"We will not reverse criminal causes for mere
error or irregularities. It is only when there has
been error which is both substantial and prejudicial
to the rights of the accused that a reversal is warranted."
For a similar ruling, see State v. Justenson, 35 Utah
105, 99 P. 456. Section 77-29-1 is relied on by appellant
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and quoted in his brief. It prescribes a procedural requirement. But failure to comply with the section is not error
unless the appellant is prejudiced and his substantive right
effected. We have found no cases, nor has appellant cited
any, wherein a conviction was reversed on the ground of
failure to comply with Section 77-29-1.

CONCLUSION
In the case before the court, the information was filed
on May 16th. Appellant was arraigned on May 17th and
trial was had on June 18th, all within the same term of
court. We have been unable to find any cases reversing a
conviction on the grounds alleged here and under circumstances similar to this case. In Utah, Section 77-51-1
amounts to a supplement and a legislative definition of the
right to a "speedy trial". In cases cited by appellant and in
those we have found, reversals were based on a failure to
grant a continuance to the defendant or on the ground that
the delays in trial violated code provisions similar to Section 77-51-1. This statute was not violated in the case before the court. It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CALLISTER,
Attorney General,
GARY L. THEURER,
Assistant Attorney General,

Attorneys for Respondent.
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